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Abstract
The strengthening of prudential regulation has, in general, led to increased concentration of
the financial sector. While better prudential regulation may deliver a benefit in terms of higher
solvency, it is usually understood that more concentration, in general, implies higher spreads.
Thus, there is a view that these prudential measures imply a tradeoff between solvency and
competition. In this paper we want to argue that such a tradeoff does not necessarily exist. We
present a model in which product differentiation decreases with concentration potentially
inducing more intense competition, and therefore lower spreads. We provide evidence from a
cross section of countries in favor of this alternative view.
1. Introduction
The strengthening of prudential regulation has, in general, led to increased competition
of the financial sector. Because more stringent prudential regulation increases the costs
of operating in the industry (in turn making some institutions unprofitable), it has
induced consolidation in the industry. While better prudential regulation may deliver a
benefit in terms of more s lvency, it is usually understood that more concentration, in
general, implies larger spreads, because with fewer financial institutions the industry
becomes less competitive. Thus, there is a view that these prudential measures imply a
tradeoff between solvency and competition. We call this the “traditional view” and it
has been discussed in much of the banking literature.1  Instead, in this paper we present
a model in which product differentiation decreases with concentration, inducing more
intense competition rather than less, and potentially, leading to lower spreads.
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2Our challenge to the traditional view is motivated by the recent evolution of the
financial sector in Argentina. Figures 1 through 4 give a brief description of some of
the most important facts. Starting in 1993 the financial sector has experienced a
substantial tightening of prudential regulation.2 Capital requirements were increased,
reserve requirements were extended to all bank liabilities (previously CD’s were
exempt), contributions to a newly created deposit insurance scheme were instituted,
and fees were collected to pay for access to an international line of credit, in case of a
run on the domestic financial sector.  These measures, together with the financial crisis
that followed the Tequila crisis, induced a drastic reduction in the number of banks.
While this process was particularly strong during 1995, it continues to date. Yet, in
spite of the increase in concentration, financial intermediation margins have also
fallen.
An immediate interpretation is that financial intermediation margins may have fallen
because the crisis eliminated high-risk institutions, which yielded higher than average
returns. However, Figure 1 shows this not to be the case. Figure 1 measures the return
to financial intermediation for Argentina’s 20 largest banks. This (monthly) rate of
return is calculated as interest plus service income as a fraction of bank assets. The
graph shows clearly how margins have decreased over the last five years, dropping
from about 11% to about 6% per year. The reduction in margins for the top players in
the market motivates a story based on how the regulatory changes may have affected
competition among them.
Figure 2, shows how, during the same period, concentration has increased. As can be
seen in the graph, the number of institutions fell from 207 in 1993 to 135 in 1998.3
Figure 3 shows how concentration increased as a result. The H rfindahl index for
loans (shown) as well as for deposits increased substantially during the period. While
there was still a large number of institutions in 1998, the system had consolidated
significantly since 1995.
Finally, in Figure 4 we have show how capital requirements have changed during this
period. Capital requirements play an important role in our model below. Argentina
incorporated Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices,
with a risk weighted asset/equity ratio as the principal measure of capital adequacy.
These requirements, which were the standard 8% by 1993, were increased half a point
each six months and finally increased to 11.5% by early 1995, shortly after the Tequila
crisis. As of September 1, 1996 additional requirements addressing market risk,
including the volatility of securities, foreign currency, equity and derivatives were
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3established. Later on, the Central Bank has continued to tighten these requirements.4 In
all, these regulatory changes have increased the minimum required capital requirement
as shown in Figure 4.
Anecdotal evidence also points in the direction of a financial sector with more
concentration and lower margins. In fact, Horacio Chighizola, President of Banco de la
Ciudad de Buenos Aires, in assessing the outlook for the financial sector has stated5
Consequently, in the new scenario there will be f wer anks and more competition. Nobody anticipates
a traumatic situation but a process of mergers and acquisitions with the incorporation of foreign
capitals and the participation of new players strengthening a trend with already begun to manifest itself.
(Emphasis added).
All this poses a puzzle for the traditional view. ¿How can it be that a more
concentrated financial sector (with fewer banks) can have lower spreads (be more
competitive)?
Our model addresses this question. In the model, banks choose the degree of
differentiation of their financial services. The higher the degree of differentiation, the
higher the price that banks can charge to its customers. Yet, the higher the degree of
differentiation, the smaller the client base for whom the bank’s services are
appropriate. Consider now a tightening of capital requirements. Because this makes the
banking industry less profitable ther  will be exit from the industry, i.e. concentration
increases. We show that in the new equilibrium, the degree of differentiation chosen
will be lower, making banks more similar from the viewpoint of the user of financial
services. Thus, two forces will be operating upon spreads. The higher degree of
concentration will provide firms with larger market power and induce them to charge
bigger spreads, however, the lower degree of differentiation forces banks to compete
more intensively in prices. We show that, as a result, spreads may either increase or
decrease.
In the new equilibrium, local and specialized banks are replaced by fewer banks, more
geographically spread and broader in scope.  While fewer, they are more similar, and
therefore en up competing more directly, and offering lower prices. Concentration, in
this setup, may be associated to more competition.
In our model, banks´ solvency is threatened by random shocks. Depending on the
magnitude of these shocks, borrowers will be able or not to repay their debts. We will
show that the model delivers two results depending on the relative size of these shocks.
If they are sufficiently large, and bankruptcy is possible, an increase in capital
requirements may induce more competition in the way we have just described.
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4However, if shocks are small and bankruptcy never occurs, we will show that capital
requirements are irrelevant for the competitiveness of the financial sector.
Our empirical work draws on this implication by trying to test whether financial
intermediation margins respond differently to changes in the capital requirements in
developed economies (presumably with smaller shocks) than in emerging market
economies (presumably with larger shocks). We build a three-year panel for 44
countries, and test whether capital requirements have a significant effect on
intermediation margins. Consistent with the model, and with the intuition discussed
before, we show that for emerging economies capital requirements d c d financial
intermediation spreads, and that this effect is statistically significant. For developed
economies, we find no effects.
Not only increases in capital requirements are associated to increased concentration of
the financial sector. Other examples include the elimination of branching restrictions in
the US, or the opening up of the financial sector to foreign investment. In the literature
there was a general consensus that increased concentration could lead to less
competition in the industry (a point discussed in Mi hkin, 1996). In fact, there is ample
empirical evidence for industrialized countries, suggesting that spreads increase with
the degree of concentration. Gilbert (1984) provides a comprehensive description of
these empirical studies.
This traditional view has, however, come under increasing pressure. If concentration is
endogenous, then running spreads on concentration will be mispec fied. The effects of
concentration on spreads will be different if concentration increases due to a decrease
in barriers to entry or due to increased market power. Shaffer (1994) considers the new
IO empirical literature to take a new look at the relation between market concentration
and competition. Using markup tests, she finds that it is difficult to reject the
hypothesis of competitive behavior in the banking industry. In fact, Shaffer (1993)
finds that the banking sector is competitive in the most concentrated market among 15
developed economies considered.6
For developing economies, the positive relation between concentration and market
power, and therefore spreads, has also been questioned. Zahler and Budnevich (1998)
present evidence for several Latin American countries, which suggests a negative
relationship between these two variables.
Several hypotheses can be suggested to explain this negative relation between banking
concentration and spreads. One hypothesis is that increased competition may arise
from a reduction in regulatory restrictions that inhibited bank competition. Thus,
concentration increases as the result of more intense competition rather than less.
Branching restrictions in the US would be a typical example. An alternative story
relies, on the contrary, on the potential effects of imposing new regulatory restrictions
such as capital requirements. Capital requirements, for example, may reduce the
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5number of financial institutions because they eliminate high-risk institutions. The
evidence of Argentina shown below, in which spreads fall even for the largest banks,
tends to suggest that this should not be the whole story. Br ckand Rojas Suarez
(1998) suggest that the result may arise from a change in the risk behavior of banks,
induced by the fact that increasing capital requirements reduces the option value of
government deposit insurance making the profit function of the banks less convex, and
therefore inducing a more cautious approach to risk taking. We believe, again, that this
approach should be limited for large and well-established financial institutions. Again,
the evidence from Argentina suggests this cannot be the whole story. Thus, in this
paper we search for a model that may explain this stylized fact, without relying on
changes in risk taking behavior. Thus, we present a model in which product
differentiation decreases with concentration inducing more intense competition and
potentially, lower spreads.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 discusses
the international evidence on the relation between spreads and banking regulation.
Section 4 provides some conclusions and some thoughts for future research.
2. The Model
Consider a Salop circular city with a perimeter equal to one, and a unitary density of
entrepreneurs located uniformly around the circle. Entrepreneurs have available the
possibility of undertaking a common fixed sized project. In order to undertake their
projects, entrepreneurs need to borrow resources from financial intermediaries which
we will call banks.7 Banks are also located around the circle. Each bank is allowed to
locate in only one location. There is free entry into the banking industry but banks are
forced by a regulatory body to maintain a capital requirement. Due to limited liability,
increasing this capital requirement will increase the cost of operating a financial
institution.
The timing of the model is as follows. Given the level of capital requirements, banks
decide to enter or not in the industry, and once they have chosen to participate they
decide what rate to charge for their loans and the degree by which they will specialize
as providers of financial intermediation services. Once banks choose these two
characteristics, entrepreneurs choose their bank of preference and loans are provided.
After loans have been assigned, banks are also subject to shocks, which may turn some
of the assets non-performing. If shocks are severe enough, banks may be forced to
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6draw from the capital requirement to return their deposits. If these funds are not
enough they will be forced into bankruptcy.
These shocks capture possible regional or activity specific shocks. If a bank
concentrates in a particular line of business, lower prices or lower productivity will
make many of his clients insolvent. If a bank concentrates in a particular region, any
regional macro shock will also imply a lower rate of repayment.8
The model is built in the framework of the Salop circular city, which implies that
entrepreneurs are differentiated on the basis of geographical location. This fits
naturally with the intuition of bank branching and regional location of financial
institutions. However, we consider our model to be equally applicable to financial
institutions that specialize in different sector of activities. In this case location in the
circular city will correspond to particular activities and these would be changing
smoothly as one moves around the circle.
2.1 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are located uniformly around the circle. Each entrepreneur has the
option of undertaking or not a project of fixed size (without loss of generality we
normalize its size to be one). Each entrepreneur needs a financial intermediary in order
to obtain the funds to undertake his/her project.9
Consider an entrepreneur l that decides to borrow from bank i which is located at a
distance ilx  from his/her location. Bank i charges a rate of ai for its loans and has a
degree specialization of iq . The return from undertaking the project with this bank
will be equal to:
iiliiiilil axVaxU --= qqq )(),,(
The higher iq , the better will the bank satisfy the needs of the consumers located close
to its own location. However, this improved appeal to closer clients implies, that the
bank will be a poorer intermediary for entrepreneurs located farther away. Therefore,
the utility of entrepreneurs will fall with distance from a bank at a higher rate the larger
the degree of specialization chosen by the bank. We also assume that the value of
differentiation (the sum of the first two terms) decreases linearly in the distance from
the bank. We assume that )( iV q  satisfies 0)´( >iV q  and 0)´´( <iV q , i.e. that there are
decreasing returns to specialization.
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7Figure 5 shows the utility of entrepreneurs, describing how it depends on the degree of
specialization chosen by the bank. For q2>q1, the curve H(q2) shows the entrepreneur
utility obtained when the bank chooses a high degree of specialization, providing high
utility for entrepreneurs located close to the bank and very little utility for those
located farther away. Conversely, the curve L(q1) depicts the utility obtained from a
bank which chooses a lower level of differentiation. It does not provide such a good
service to those located close to its location but at the same time this service does not
decrease as quickly with distance from the bank.
Our setup on differentiation captures two possible intuitions. One is that the bank
specializes in a certain region, or line of activity, investing resources and building
expertise, so that transaction costs, valuation of collateral, determination of product
specification, etc. are more efficiently done when the bank operates within this region
or with entrepreneurs in this line of business. The higher the degree of specificity in
the bank’s activities, the lower the transaction costs for the group of entrepreneurs
belonging to the target group of the bank (and therefore the higher their utility) but the
lower will it be for those not included in that group. Alternatively, the bank may
choose to define a more homogeneous product, which caters to no group in particular,
but potentially has a larger market.
An alternative story is that each entrepreneur has a portfolio of investment projects.
One is very profitable but very specific to his/her location; the other is a common, less
profitable opportunity. Some banks may choose to specialize in financing particular
types of projects. This will provide a higher rate of return for entrepreneurs that can
finance their specific high return project, but is relatively useless to other
entrepreneurs. Conversely, the bank may choose to provide financing for the simpler
and more common project. The rate of return is lower, but this financing serves
potentially a larger market.
The entrepreneur l chooses the bank that maximizes its utility
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2.2 Banks
There is free entry into the banking industry. If a bank decides to enter the market,
each bank has access to a pool of deposits at an interest cost of p.10 The bank lends at
rate ai. Banks, however, not only choose ai, but also have to choose the degree of
specialization iq of their banking services. Jointly, these two variables will shape the
demand faced by the bank.
                                         
10 This fixed deposit rate which does not depend on its riskiness, can be viewed as the result of a deposit
insurance scheme. Besanko and Takor (1992) use a similar odelling assumption.
8Banks are subject to shocks, which turn some of their assets non-performing. These
shocks are described by a uniform distribution [ ]S0,U~is .  If the bank does not
generate enough revenues from its assets to pay for deposits it has to use up its own
capital to repay them. If these are not enough, the bank is declared bankrupt and the
deposit insurance scheme takes responsibility for the residual fraction of depositors yet
unpaid.
The government sets a minimum amount of capital that banks have to commit in order
to participate in the banking industry. We do not model here why the government
wants to impose these capital requirements, but given limited liability banks will find
convenient to transfer as much of the losses in unfavorable states of nature to the
deposit insurer by choosing low levels of capitalization. If there are social bankruptcy
costs, the government may have an incentive to reduce this incentive by imposing a
minimum level of capital.
We denote this requirement by K, and we assume that its opportunity cost is precisely
the passive rate p. Because no other restriction is imposed on the use of this capital
requirement, banks will obviously choose to lend this capital requirement. Banks
earning will then equal
Where di indicates the demand (total amount of loans) faced by the bank. The bank’s
profits equal the return on its loans (1+ai)di, minus the opportunity cost of its funds
(that is, the passive rate p, applied both to deposits (di-K) and to the banks own capital
K). Finally, the shock faced by the bank also has to be subtracted. This reduces to the
markup on lending minus the shock, as in the last equality above.
These will be the bank’s profits as long as it has the resources to pay depositors. This
will be the case as long as revenues are larger than its debt, i.e. as long as:
This condition reduces to
If this condition is not satisfied the bank is declared bankrupt and the bank loses its
capital requirement plus the opportunity cost of having invested those resources in the
banking activity, i.e. K(1+p).
[ ] =-+-+--+ ---- iiiiiiiiiiii spKpKaadaada )1()1(),,,(),,,()1( qqqq
[ ]  )1(),,,(),,,()1( pKaadsaada iiiiiiiiii +-<-+ ---- qqqq
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9The profit of bank i function can be written then as:
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The profit function is depicted in figure 6, which shows how profits decrease as the
size of the shock increases. The convexity of the profit function is the result of the
assumption of limited liability. Thus, in our setup, banks would prefer to finance all
their lending with deposits. It is the regulation that prevents them from doing so. We
will see below that the regulation imposes a cost, which keeps the number of financial
institutions bound.
Within this setup we have to consider two possible scenarios. As specified in (1) and
dropping the subscripts, a bank will go bankrupt if the shock faced is larger than (a-
p)+(1+p)K. Thus bankruptcy can arise if SKppad <++- )1()( , i.e. when capital
requirements are small relative to the potential shocks faced by the financial sector. In
this case the profit function of a financial institution can be written as:
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However, it may be the case that shocks in the economy are so small relative to the
capital requirement that no bank ever goes bankrupt. In this case the profit function
reduces to the upper half of equation (1), i.e. profits will be equal to:
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Whether banks solve their optimization problem using (2) or (2´) depends on whether
condition SKppad <++- )1()(  is satisfied. As stated, however, this depends on
endogenous variables such as d and a. The appendix shows, however, that a necessary
and sufficient condition for banks to use (2´) is that
2
)1(
S
pK ³+ .  On the contrary
when 
2
)1(
S
pK £+ , (2) should be used.
Thus, depending on the size of the shocks faced by the financial sector we have two possible
scenarios to consider: the larg -shock and small-shock economies.
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2.3 The large-shock economy
In order to maximize profits banks will have to determine how, if they decide to enter
the market, their choice of ai and iq  affects their demand. Consider an entrepreneur
located between banks i and j. If the distance to bank i is xˆ and the total number of
banks is n, the distance to bank j will equal 1/n- xˆ, because the distance between the
two banks in a symmetric equilibrium will equal 1/n. Figure 7, depicts the situation.
The entrepreneur will be indifferent between using bank i a d j if both give him
the same utility level:
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Thus, bank i will provide loans to all entrepreneurs located from its location through xˆ:
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Using symmetry, total demand for bank i is twice that amount:
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Banks substitute (3) in (2) and maximize respect to iq  and ai. The appendix shows that the
first order conditions in a symmetric equilibrium can be reduced to:
n
pa
*q
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A sufficient condition for second order conditions to be satisfied is =V´´(q )q /V´(q )<-1/2.
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These results say that the interest rate charged by the bank will equal the bank’s borrowing
rate, plus a mark-up which is increasing in the degree of concentration. Notice, however, that
the markup is increasing in the degree of specialization iq . In turn, equation (5), indicates that
the choice of differentiation also depends on the degree of concentration. In fact, the fewer the
number of firms, the lower the degree of differentiation chosen by the bank because V´´(q)<0.
Thus, it is not clear how the spreads will move as the number of firms changes.
In order to close the model we substitute from (4) and (5) into (2). Equilibrium profits are
equal to:
Using the free entry condition which forces banks profits to be equal to zero we find that for
the only real positive root the equilibrium number of banks is equal to:
q
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Jointly with (4) and (5), equation (6) completes a system of three equation with three
unknowns: a, n and q .
Recall that in order to obtain (4), (5) and (6) we used a profit function under the assumption
that KpadS +-> ** )( , i.e. that bankruptcy was possible. In the symmetric Nash
equilibrium this condition reduces to:
The appendix shows that this condition will hold as long as 
2
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pK <+ . Thus, the above
case is relevant if the capital requirements are small relative to the shocks in the economy,
i.e. in the large-shock economy.
2.4 Small-shock economy
Banks may believe that shocks are not sufficiently large and therefore may think it is
appropriate to use equation (2´) rather than (2). In this case upon solving for the optimization
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problem we obtain that in the symmetric Nash equilibrium, a* and q* are also defined by (4)
and (5). Substituting in (2´) the equilibrium profits are now:
giving an equilibrium number of  banks:
(6´)
Equation (2´) must be used if KpadS +-< ** )( . The appendix shows that substituting for
(4), (5) and  (6´) into (2´), that this condition will be satisfied as long as 
2
)1(
S
pK ³+ .  Thus,
if capital requirements are sufficiently large we will be placed in the small shock economy.
2.5 The effects of capital requirements
Because our main focus is on the effects of capital requirement regulation we are interested
in the comparative static of equations (4), (5) and (6) for the large-shocks conomy and (4),
(5) and (6´) for the small-shock economy, with respect to K.
Notice that for the small-shock economy, capital requirements cannot have any effect on the
equilibrium as the system (4), (5) and (6´) because neither of these equations depends on K.
We concentrate on the more interesting case of an economy with large-shocks.
Differentiating the system (4), (5) and (6) and evaluating it at the optimum we have:
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which can be shown to be negative as long as 
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The Jacobian can be reduced to
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which, under our assumption of  V´´(q )q /V´(q )<-1/2, is negative.
Solving for the individual effects we have that:
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Thus, our results are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
1
2
1
->>- e
1-<e
dK
dn Negative Negative
dK
dq Negative Negative
dK
da Negative Positive
The model therefore delivers the result that the larger the capital requirement the lower the
number of financial institutions, i.e. the more stringent capital requirements the higher the
degree of concentration of the financial sector. The second result is that the higher the level
of capital requirements, the lower the degree of differentiation chosen by banks. As
concentration increases, banks choose to better satisfy the demand of entrepreneurs further
away. This result is also very intuitive. When lowering the number of banks, we increase the
relevance of entrepreneurs located far away, so banks adjust their degree of specificity, in
order to better satisfy their demand.
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The effect of an increase of the capital requirement on the spreads of the financial sector is,
however, ambiguous. On the one hand, an increase in the capital requirements reduces the
number of banks increasing a* in (4). On the other hand, it reduces the level of product
specialization rendering a reduction of a* (see also (4)). Which of these effects predominates
depends on the elasticity of the marginal value of product specialization. When this elasticity
is large in absolute value, then the traditional result holds. Instead, for small values, an
increase in capital requirement induces a reduction in spreads.
2.6. Solvency
The motivation for imposing capital requirements arises from the need to improve the
solvency of the financial sector. With limited liability, banks prefer to have no capital
requirements and to have the government bail them out through the deposit insurance
scheme.
In the specification of the model we can assess the effect of K on banks´ solvency. The
probability of bankruptcy is given by:
Which, given the uniform distribution assumed for the shocks, reduces to:
For 
2
)1(
S
pK <+  it is easy to show that this probability decreases in K. Thu , as expected,
the system becomes more solvent as the capital requirement increases.
3. Empirics
The model predicts that the level of capital requirements have no effect on spreads in
economies in which shocks are (relatively) small, but that they do affect spreads when
shocks are (relatively) large. For large-shock economies, the sign of this effect is
theoretically ambiguous. We analyze these predictions considering the effect of capital
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requirements on spreads for a panel of 44 countries11 from 1995 to 1997 (120 country-
year observations) by running the following reduced-form fixed-effect regression:
where for country i in period t, bank real spreads (Spreads) are a function of the level
of the capital requirements (Kapreq), country-fixed effects (G) and the controls. A
controls we include several variables that possibly influence bank spreads: GDP per
capita (GDPcap) may capture the effect of the level of economic development and
wealth, GDP growth (Growth) captures business cycle effects, inflation (Inflat)
controls for the effect of inflation on real spreads, liquidity (Liquid) proxies for the
effect of liquidity requirements, inefficiency (In ff) controls for bank costs, and risk
(Risk) considers the effect of country risk on spreads. Appendix 2 describes the data
definitions and data sources.
Table 2 presents our results. In Column A, when considering a similar effect of capital
requirements on spreads both for developed and developing countries, we find no
significant effect. However, the model predicts that capital requirements affect spreads
only when shocks are relatively large and bankruptcy is possible. For the empirical
analysis, we map these different shock sizes (large shock vs. small shock economies)
as a difference between developed and under-developed economies. The latter group
includes economies which suffer relatively large shocks (have a large S in the model
terms) while developed economies suffer shocks which are relatively smaller. In
Column B, we allow the capital requirement coefficient to differ for developed and
under-developed economies. The results show that capital requirements have no effect
on spreads for developed countries, while they have a negative effect for
underdeveloped countries. These results are in line with the predictions of our model
and with the facts described in the Argentine experience.
Surprisingly, the results in Column B suggest that the degree of country uncertainty
has a negative (although non-significant) effect on bank spreads. We suspect that this
anomalous result is driven by the late Southeast Asia experience, where due to
nominal interest rate regulation, the recent increase in country risks has been
accompanied by a reduction in real interest rates. We allow the effect of country risk to
differ for the Asian countries in our sample. When allowing the effect of risk to be
different for Asian countries, in these countries risk has a negative and significant
effect. For the rest of the countries the effect is positive and non-significant. The
                                         
11 The countries in our sample are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Korea, Philippines, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
Hungary, Poland, Russia, Turkey, South Africa, Israel, Germany, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greek, Netherlands, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway,
New Zealand, Portugal, United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland.
++++G= tititiiti GrowthGDPcapKapreqSpreads ,3,2,1, bbb
tititititi RiskIneffLiquidInflat ,,7,6,5,4 mbbbb ++++
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results in Column C, confirm the finding of a negative and significative coefficient for
the capital requirement variable. The results also show a negative effect for GDP
growth and inflation and a positive effect for bank inefficiency.
4. Conclusions
There has been relatively little work on the relation between bank regulation and market
structure. However, the counterintuitive effects of certain regulations, as the case of
Argentina and cross-country evidence shows, suggests that these effects may be important. In
this paper we build a model which accounts for these facts: tighter regulation implies more
concentration of the financial sector but generates more similarity between institutions,
leading to more intense competition in spite of higher concentration.
The model suggests that capital requirements may not necessarily be costly, because they
lead simultaneously to a more solvent and a more competitive financial sector. Obviously,
one should be cautious when moving from the model to reality. First of all, our model has an
ambiguous policy implication: spreads could go up or down with concentration. It is obvious
that once firms decrease to the point that only one remains, our result will not hold any
longer (remember that they were derived assuming at least two banks). Depending on the
functional specification it is possible that as the number of banks decrease, we move into the
region where spreads increase with regulation. Thus, our result that there is no tradeoff
between solvency and competition may disappear even with a relatively large number of
banks.
The specification can be extended in several ways. For example, we need to discuss the links
between different regulations. Our model goes through with full credible deposit insurance.
Once we lift this assumption depositor’s behavior will have to be taken into account.
Similarly we must enrich the model from the borrower side. If there are risky and not so risky
borrowers, then capital requirements may affect the risk composition of bank portfolios (a
point stressed by Brock and Rojas Suarez, 1998).
It is important to verify whether globalization may have affected our results. It may well be
the case that local concentration may have increased but that due to the opening of financial
markets, banks are subject to increased international competition. This, in turn, implies that
using nation-wide concentration indexes may be misleading. A rel ted point is made by
Mishkin (1996) and Yellen (1995) regarding bank concentration in the US. They suggest that
in spite of increased concentration at the national level, the degree of concentration at the
local level may have not changed.
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Appendix 1
Assuming symmetry, the first order conditions obtained fr m  maximizing (2) with respect to
iq  and ai give:
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Equation (A.1) has two solutions. However one gives an active rate lower than the passive
rate. Thus the correct solution is the one shown in (4). Similarly in (A.2), using the
appropriate solution to (A.1) gives the solution shown in (5).
In order to show second order conditions we differentiate the profit function twice with
respect to iq and ai,  which gives under symmetry and in the optimum:
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The Hessian can be shown to equal:
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Appendix 2
Variable Definition Source
Spreads Net Interest Income/Average Earning Assets* Thomson BankStat
Kapreq Capital Requirements: Shareholders’ Equity
divided by Total Loans*
Thomson BankStat
GDPcap GDP per capita (in U$S dollars) IMF
Growth Rate of real GDP growth IMF, Goldman Sachs and
Thomson BankWatch
Inflat Inflation: annual growth rate of consumer price
index
IMF
Liq Liquidity: Liquid Assets divided by Total
Deposits*
homson BankStat
Ineff Inefficiency: Non-interest Expenses divided by
Operating Income*
Thomson BankStat
Risk Numerical conversion of sovereign credit rate
given by credit rating agencies: 1 corresponds
to the worst rate found for the countries in the
sample (C) and 17 corresponds to the highest
rate (AAA)
Thomson BankStat
Non-
Developed
Dummy=1 for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, Korea, Philippines, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
Hungary, Poland, Russia, Turkey, South Africa
and Israel, =0 otherwise
Asian Dummy=1 for Korea, Philippines, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand,
=0 otherwise
* Average of 20 largest banks per country included in BankStat –or maximum number
available if BankStat follows less than 20 banks- weighted by Total Loans.
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Table 2
Dependent Variable: Spreads
Variables (A) (B) (C)
Capital requirement
-0.17095
(-1.401)
0.08788
(1.552)
0.04032
(0.425)
Capital requirement *
Underdeveloped
-0.35150***
(-2.663)
-0.30042**
(-2.038)
GDPcap
2.38e-08
(0.051)
1.83e-07
(0.422)
3.48e-07
(0.831)
Growth
-0.12536*
(-1.673)
-0.14749*
(-1.989)
-0.12214*
(-1.808)
Inflation
-0.03768
(-1.463)
-0.04410*
(-1.770)
-0.04834**
(-2.018)
Liquidity
0.00782
(0.644)
0.01086
(0.963)
0.00216
(0.192)
Inefficiency
0.01361
(1.587)
0.01053
(1.236)
0.01884**
(2.230)
Risk
-0.00142
(-0.821)
-0.00160
(-0.900)
0.00761
(1.454)
Risk*Asian dummy
-0.01127**
(2.087)
Country-fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 120 120 120
R2 0.9426 0.9458 0.9508
White robust t-statistics in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
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Fig. 1 - Financial intermediation margin
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Fig. 2 - Number of Banks
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Fig. 3 - Deposit Concentration
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Fig.4 - Capital requirements
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Fig.5 - Entrepreneur´s utility function
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Fig. 6 - The Profit Function
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Fig.7 - The Circular City
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